3: Hart E-5 (1953-1954)1954 MX3 Rif MX3

near Sūq al-Arba' of Taurirt. Olive oil, extracted from a communally owned olive grinder and oil press, is the essential fat (1).

The fields, orchards and vegetable gardens (the latter producing broad beans, chickpeas, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, peppers and carrots, to mention only a few) of the Aith Wuryāghil are usually terraced near the houses, along the slopes of the mountains. The vineyards, whither the families repair in September to pick grapes, are further up; and along the crests are the communal goat pastures and the *ghāba* patches, where the women go to cut brushwood for their ovens and for the local mosque. Grape picking is the only important activity in September, which marks the end of the agricultural year; after this is done and after the barley has been reaped and threshed and the silos piled up, people make merry and get married before the first rains begin again and the time to plow and sow has started up once more.

Herding and agricultural contracts of a verbal nature are made between the wealthier and the poorer men of the community, those who have little hiring themselves out to those who have more (2). Individuals who own more animals than they can pasture themselves hire herders who, while the beasts are in their charge, receive all the milk and butter and half the young ones born, and, when the animals are sold, half the profits; if the contract concerns sheep, they receive half the wool as well. Vegetable gardens and orchards are cared for by hired gardeners *(rabbā')* who receive one-fourth of the fruit and vegetable crop; as their job entails setting up terraces, they sometimes get one-third of the vegetables if the land is difficult to work. These same men, if they also perform all the operations necessary for cereal cultivation, are called *ikhammāsen* and receive one-fifth of the barley and wheat crop. The owner of the field supplies the seed, the animals (usually cows) and the plow as well in this type of contract, while the *akhammās* (sing. of *ikhammāsen*) provides only his muscles and a switch to keep the cattle moving while they are under the yoke. The *akhammās* contract is the most

(1) Coon, Carleton Stevens: Caravan, The Story of the Middle East, New York 1951, p. 313.

(2) Sánchez Pérez, Andrés: Aprovechamientos comunales y formas de cooperación en las yemaas del Rif, Africa, Madrid, Noviembre 1947, pp. 75-77.

3: Hart E-5 (1953-1954)1954 MX3 Rif MX3

The akhammās contract is the most
common type, but also current is a slightly different class of association, called *ifarādhen* (Arabic *bil-farḍ*): two farmers who own plots of land more or less equal in size, but who do not have enough equipment to plow them on their own, join forces; the harvest is divided equally between the two parties. This form is particularly prevalent if each man concerned only possesses one cow or one mule. A third kind of association, called *dhūrī*, is very common in irrigable land; in this, one man supplies the land and half the seed, and the other the rest of the seed and the plowing equipment (animals and plow). The actual work, which may be done by an *akhammās*, and the payment of other hired personnel to help with the reaping, is taken care of by both parties, and the net profit, deducting one-fifth for the *akhammās*, is divided in half.

Except in the Bay of Alhucemas, where irrigation is practiced without terracing, and in the valley of the Upper Ghīs, where there is much terracing but little irrigation, irrigation ditches (*tharga*, pl. *tharghiwīn*) and terraced fields, gardens and orchards are everywhere else to be found jointly in Aith Wuryāghil; the distribution of the one is virtually the same as that of the other. Ownership of irrigation water is largely dependent upon ownership of land, for in Aith Wuryāghil the owner of a plot of land is also the owner of the subsoil, and the waters which pass through his territory belong to him. Water is utilized by human beings, animals, lands and industries; rights of preference are in that order, the industries being represented by water mills (3), the owners of which receive one-tenth of the grain which the mills grind as their commission.

The Rīf, however, is a land not favored by nature, and water is a perennial problem. In Aith Wuryāghil, the people in the mountains receive first use of the water, while those in the Bay of Alhucemas irrigate with the remainder. The turns of each family in getting water are based on the principle of equal distribution, and natural means are used to calculate the time. Men have first call on water consumption, and the rest is reserved for women, for whom it is custo-

(3) Blanco Izaga, Emilio: El Rif (2.ª parte-La Ley Rifeña): II. Los Cánones Rifeños Comentados, Ceuta 1939, pp. 101-138.

181 Moreover, even though many jural details of life during the
178 'Ripublik' have now been forgotten, many attitudes and values of
that era, which, as noted, lasted until the advent of 'Abd al-Krim
[421] in 1921, are still fully present. The Rifian keeps an iron grip on
[562] what belongs to him, and this applies particularly to his womenfolk,
who, albeit highly respected, are kept equally secluded and segre-
[423] gated. Also, his land, poor as it may be, is his own and no one
[628] else's, in true "territorial imperative" style. But especially with
554 the coming of the protectorate, the values underlying the bloodfeud,
464 which was once the dominant political institution of the society,
were channeled into the newer direction of labor migration: in the
old days of the 'Ripublik', a man had to kill his enemy to make his
[464] mark, while more recently he had to go out and get a job. (Until
1962 and Algerian Independence, work on the farms of French colons
in that country was the favored mode and region of labor migration,
while since that time the current has shifted to Western Europe.)

181 The Aith Waryaghar uprising against the Indepent Moroccan Govern-
669 ment in 1958-1959 - which was forcibly put down by the new Royal Army
in its first post-Independence test of strength - was a graphic in-
dication, at the tribal level, that the old values of Rifian "apart-
ness" within the wider national Moroccan society are still resistant
to change, for despite its "modern" objectives, the uprising itself
was carried out in a "traditional", "take-to-the-hills" manner. And
these same values are even more discernible, today as in Blanco's
621 time, at the level of the jma'th, the local community. Community life
671 among the Aith Waryaghar is both intense and inner-directed, as, for

000 latter's kinsmen before he can get away. Even in this case, the killer could generally get off if he were able to pay a 2000-duro fine (rhaqq) to the imgharen on the spot, if he was lucky enough to be caught by them and not by his victim's agnates.

[114] [464] [167] 52--Why should the Rifians have been acquainted with the qanuns of the Algerian Kabyles? Granted that Rifian labor migration to Algeria, prior to 1955, was very extensive, it must be remembered that Rifians went to the plains and vineyards of western Algeria (not to Kabylia) to work and send remittances to their families, not to compare notes with their fellow Berbers in Kabylia!

53--This is entirely true, though we know of one case in which, in 1926, after 'Abd al-Krim's defeat, a man from one of the mountain clans of Aith Waryaghar was beaten to death, by order of a lowland qaid from the same tribe, for refusing to hand two rifles in his possession over to the Spaniards.

[171] 54--In the Central Atlas, half ddiyit (blood money to victim's agnates) is paid by a man for shooting at someone else and missing him, but full ddiyit for taking aim and not shooting (E. Gellner, "The Concept of Kinship", Philosophy of Science, vol. 27, no. 2, 1960, pp. 187-204.) In other words, what is punished is the intent to kill, and on this subject Blanco has some interesting remarks to make in the chapter on the qanuns of Dhasind and of Aith 'Abd Allah in La Ley Rifeña (pp. 41-3, 47, 50). In the Rif, however, this is manifested in a different way under different circumstances: ddiyith is paid to the victim's family, under normal conditions, by the killer, who must also pay rqisas to the victim himself in case of wounding. The amount of the ddiyith is anything up to 1200 duros, while that of the rqisas, depends on the nature of the wound. However, there is no question at all of either ddiyith or rqisas being paid if the intended victim has not been harmed. This is the case if the attempted murder has taken place outside the market; but if it has taken place on market day and within the market (even though there is again an exemption from ddiyith and rqisas) the rhaqq or market fine must be paid in full (2000 duros) to the imgharen, because the would-be assassin is an amsasar (pl. imsasaren) or trouble-maker who has knowingly tried to "break" the market by flouting its regulations.

681 682 696 [613] 55--In case of murder, only the murderer himself went into exile. He did so immediately after the crime, so that he would not be killed in turn by his victim's agnates. Exile meant that he sought refuge, as an adhrib (pl. idhriben), (derived from Arabic talib, "enemy") in the territory of another tribe, whose members sheltered and protected him until such time (if ever) that he could go home. On occasion, as Blanco suggests, whole lineages have been forced into exile; Coon, in Flesh of the Wild Ox (pp. 74-108), gives an example from the Igzinnayen. However, this particular instance was the result of a decree of the Aitharba'in after a long and bitter feud; and as such, it was exceptional. The rule was that only the murderer fled; he was not accompanied by nine of his agnates, as in the Central Atlas (even though these latter returned after three days in order to start making overtures for payment of ddiyit to the dead man's agnates).

000 66--The tomb of Sidi Bu 'Afif is located in Tafrast of the Aith Mhand n Yihya, near Ajdir, in the Aith Yusif w 'Ari. The market right beside it ceased to function after the establishment of the Spanish Protectorate.

[776] [732] 67--This saint, nicknamed Bu Rjila, "possessor of a small foot", because of his lameness, was a direct descendant of Sidi Mhand u Musa of Aith Hishim (Lower Imrabdhen). In his time, Sidi Hmid Bu Rjila, to call him as the Rifians do, was the most important saint among the lowlanders of Aith Waryaghar, and his ability both at adjudication of intra-tribal conflicts and at dispensation of baraka were legendary.

[613] [614] 68--Ajdir, or Aith Ujdir, forms a lineage unit within the subclan of the Aith Ughur Izan of the clan of the Aith Yusif w 'Ari, but not all the names which follow are those of the Aith Ujdir properly speaking.

69--This sum is only one-quarter of the usual amount for murder in the market; and we have unfortunately no explanation of why this should be the case.

70--A value judgment, of course, but not without amusement when taken in context.

71--The jillab is a cloak, formerly of wool but today often of cotton as well, with sleeves and hood, and is par excellence the Moroccan male garment.

72--Sneakers were perhaps commoner in the Rif as male footgear than any other type of shoe, in Spanish times.

[464] 73--What Blanco probably refers to by "forced internment" is that city Arabs have since Spanish times been found in tribal administration posts as white-collar workers, male nurses, etc.

[114] 74--This is hardly the case. Such city dwellers to be found in rural administration posts, in our experience, do their best not to imitate the tribesmen, who today are gradually becoming more urban, or more Westernized, in dress.

75--Blanco actually means aitharba'in rather than agraw in this particular context.

[113] 76--A concentric theory of community and/or tribal loyalties in Middle Eastern social structure has been elaborated by John Gulick, Social Structure and Culture Change in a Lebanese Village, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, New York 1955.

77--Ra'is in Arabic is "headman", from ras, "head".

[792] [113] 78--Mulay Admad al-Raisuli was a sharif from Bni 'Arus in the Jbala whose colorful career in the first quarter of the 20th century ranged from provincial governor to bandit, and whose story is most engagingly told by Rosita Forbes, The Sultan of the Mountains, New York: Holt, 1924. In early 1925, Raisuli was captured by 'Abd al-Krim and died in April of that year in Thamasind, in the heart of the Aith Waryaghar. He is buried in the village cemetery at Thamasind, and his grave, which we have seen, is in no way different from any of the others.

584 pick out a prospective husband and let it be known among her
circle of girl friends that she likes him. Within the community
[521] such information is conveyed through gossip so that it becomes
knowledge among the women in both the girl's and boy's family.
If the boy is interested he may ask his mother or grandmother
to urge the male members of his family to talk to the girl's
father. Such procedure occurs only among the poor, who are,
however, the majority.

584 Men have more say about their prospective spouse because
562 of the fear of divorce. Since the male has the option of initi-
586 ating divorce proceedings, it is thought unwise to force a son
into a marriage that he strenuously opposes, since all the advan-
tages that accrue from the match are terminated at its rupture.

584 Westermarck (1914:50-51) notes that among the Beni Wariyghar if
[782] a man wishes to marry a girl and his father opposes the match,
[571] the son can sacrifice a sheep outside the parental home, placing
an obligatory duty ('ar) on the father. He remarks that the
Riffians do not regard this as a good method for obtaining a
wife. I encountered no case of this occurring. I do know of
[593] instances in which the son has married against the father's will
[464] and has been kicked off the land. In such cases the men work as
[427] akhammas or migrate abroad in search of wage labor. In such cir-
cumstances shame is thought to fall on both parties.

584 Aside from the preferences of the couple, it is supposed
581 that a certain amount of advantage stems from marrying a relative
582 which is counterbalanced by disadvantages. My informants agreed

585 On the day before the bride goes from her home to the home of the groom's father, and after the procession collecting the grama has occurred, celebrations are held in the homes of both [574] the bride and the groom. Patri- and matrilineal kinsmen as well as friends are invited to each house. If the marriage is between related persons, the kinsmen go to the house of the person with whom they have the closest connection either in terms of nearness [582] of kinship, friendship, or both. Since marriage for the majority of the fellah occur in a close community and often with relatives, the parties are often held in adjoining houses or at least in quite nearby places. In such cases the guests often move from one party to another. The ceremony which takes place at the bride's house is also financed by the groom's family, who send over the necessary animals, bread, oil, and so forth. At the bride's house her girlhood friends dance and sing in the patio [302] for the entertainment of the ensemble. The bride's hands are [431] painted with henna during a ceremony in which each of her girl friends and older female relatives gives her a small gift (grama).

585 At the groom's house a similar ceremony takes place. If 533 the father is wealthy, or even if poor but with sufficient social 463 credit, he will hire professional musicians who play, sing and [464] dance at the home of the groom on this night and the following [465] one. These musicians, who receive $20 to $40 for the celebration, also take up contributions from the assembled guests. There is [619] a tribal fraction in the Beni Tuzin who, for obscure reasons, have taken up this occupation as their professional speciality.

452 on a quite different system with its own ideology than that which obtains in an industrial society or even among urban Moroccans. In an industrial society credit is based on tangibles, on some form of material good which has roughly an equivalent value to
452 554 the loan. In the Rif the majority of transactions involving the extension of credit are guaranteed by a personal and intangible factor, one's social status and prestige. A man's reputation, the social credits he has accumulated, the ones his father and grandfather established, are his most valuable assets. A man who has established such social credit can draw on financial resources much broader than those available to the man without it. Because he supports the integrity of the community, he can draw on the community reserve with no greater guarantee than his word. One man, a quite humble fellah, financed his son's wedding with three loans, of $150 apiece, from a brother, the son of a deceased brother, and a friend. He was able in this manner to hold a wedding ceremony of considerable elegance with over five hundred guests. In another case, in which a young man wished to marry against his father's wishes, he could find almost no financing within the community except from returning migrant labor
[197] [464] youths. Among this latter class the traditional ideology has been diluted by the industrial experience. These migrants have introduced a certain amount of novelty, especially in the material culture. Whether they shall also exert an influence in traditional social relationships and modes of social organization remains to be seen.

256 435 472 the mill collects a tenth of all the flour he processes, regardless of the level of demand or any market condition. While mills are not economically competitive with one another, they are socially competitive. As one informant put it: "My father was better than his, my grandfather better than his grandfather. If he has a mill, why shouldn't we?" If there is only one mill in a locality, which is a fairly rare circumstance, the entire community uses it. However, if there are two or more mills, the basis of preference on the part of the users is not determined by convenience of location of the mill but in terms of social factors such as either ancient antagonisms stemming from the blood feuds of the past or familial alliance based on marriage or kinship.

423 427 Just as social motives and strictures lie behind the uses of capital, so too do they influence the regulation of labor. We see this in a series of sharecropping associations which arise between a man who has more property than he alone can personally cultivate (or who is prohibited from manual labor by his social and/or religious status, such as some shorfa) and a person who holds less land than he can cultivate to meet the subsistence needs of his family. The latter may or may not be a property holder, although usually he does have a small plot of his own. Land fragmentation through the peculiarities of Islamic inheritance has, however, reduced many plots to sizes too small to meet such subsistence needs as a family requires. In these circumstances the Riffian hires out to those who have managed to keep larger estates or have acquired land through purchase.

423 The number of men under such association is difficult to estimate
427 though I have the impression it is large. No man whom I inter-
464 viewed who might be roughly classified as a leader in the community had less than one person working for him in such a relationship.

427 The most prominent and common association is that of the
464 akhammas or sharecroppers. The akhammas is a laborer who voluntarily contracts to contribute all the physical labor necessary for the total production process of a piece of land. The landowner provides the land itself, the seed, fertilizer, plough and any other equipment, and the animal power. The akhammas provides all labor, from the initial ploughing to the ultimate harvesting. [465] For his services he receives exactly one-fifth of the yield, [466] hence the name which derives from hamsa or 'five.' The akhammas also receives the hand-me-down clothes of the master and often a meal each day. Since the activities of the akhammas entail his
427 constant presence around or even inside the household, he has far
464 greater access to the wives of notables than other males. A man
562 of sufficient wealth to employ an akhammas would probably isolate his wife from contact with male society. It is a myth that the Berbers do not seclude their women. The only ones who are not secluded from male society are the wives of poor men who must contribute their labor to the production process. Such women are, of course, the vast majority. The akhammas has more contact with the wives of the notable class than any other male not closely related to the family. Since the akhammas must consult

427 464 562 [602] the wife about household tasks and often takes his meals inside the central patio, he is on rather intimate (for the Rif) terms with these women. In such a close and anomalous situation, there is a preference on the part of the master to hire a poor relative, especially of his wife, as a servant. By hiring a man of the wife's family or of a family which includes the wife's relatives by marriage, one lessens the danger of too close a relationship between wife and akhammas.

427 464 466 465 565 While both partners in the akhammas arrangement seek to establish a contract which is divorced from social conflict over women, they are nonetheless in basic conflict along incipient class lines. The akhammas, at least in the contemporary situation, regards himself as being exploited by his patron in that the wage scale is fixed and involves difficult manual labor without any guarantees of remuneration. While he is free to negotiate his contract with whomever he so desires, his wage depends directly on the size of the crop yield for any one year. The master with greater reserves of resources suffers only an inconvenience if the crop yield is low. The sharecropper, on the other hand, has few if any reserves, and any reduction in the portion of his share has serious repercussions on his ability to maintain his household. The akhammas is especially aware of the inequity of this arrangement as wage opportunities open up and he becomes aware that salary can be negotiated with commensurate rewards in cash. Most ikhammasen prefer to get into the category of wage

427 laborer, especially as a migrant worker in Europe or Algeria,
464 where salaries are high by Riffian standards.
465
466
565 On the other end of the spectrum are the landowners who regard the akhammas as the true beneficiary of the association. They argue that since they provide all the elements of production except labor, they are being exploited by the working class. The akhammas provides only his manual labor for a few weeks of ploughing and again for a few weeks at harvest time. Their contention is that although the work is arduous, it spans over a relatively short period of time for which the akhammas receives enough to meet his subsistence needs for the year. The remainder of the year the akhammas is free to contract for such labor as is available. The property owner, however, depends exclusively on his crop and thus does not have the additional revenues which the worker earns throughout the rest of the year. If the crop yield is low, the master will always see to it that the worker gets something, and besides the poor can apply for government relief while the rich can not. I suggested to several owners that they (123) engage a wage laborer for the short duration of actual work involved in performing the cultivation tasks but was met with only stony silence at the notion of such a scheme. I did not encounter and no one ever spoke of an instance in which agricultural labor was paid for in daily or weekly wages. Since the property class is in a position to change the system but does not, presumably the akhammas arrangement works to their benefit.

464 465 Although the akhammas association is the most prevalent, it is only one of several such arrangements. Another sort of laborer is the amkari, who is hired for sowing and odd jobs about the house. His salary is not fixed and he is apparently paid in cash and clothing (Hart 1956:75). Another type of traditional [233] work association is the amikhan, who is a youth employed to herd a man's goats and sheep. He ". . . is hired for a fixed period . . . [and] gets a non-stipulated sum at the end of his contract" (Hart, ibid.:75). Such an arrangement is graphically portrayed in Bowles' translation of Charhadi's autobiographical novel, A Life Full of Holes. Another form of association is the arabba' who cultivates household gardens, orchards, and trees. He is given a fourth of the fruit and vegetable crops; if the terrain is difficult to terrace, his portion is adjusted (Hart 1956:75). [256] Most mill owners employ an assistant to do the grinding, and from the mill owner's portion the worker receives a fourth of the grain.

The common element of this sort of association seems to be that the salary the laborer earns is determined by customary regulations rather than by the supply and demand of workers. It [571] [565] is an association between the elite and the poor which is based on a fixed compensation and outside of any regulation by the market economy.

675 A correlate of this situation in which commercial arrangements are based on social factors is the irrelevance of written contracts. Whereas contractual agreement forms the basis of most

675 commercial transactions in an industrial society, legal surety in the Rif tends to be based on prestige, reputation, and status. Rights, privileges, duties, immunities, and liabilities are mostly non-contractual (excluding land titles and marriage documents). 675 466 464 Thus working associations between the wealthier and poorer men of the community, whereby a laborer who provides all the work on another man's piece of property and receives one-fifth of the crop, are always verbal agreements. Likewise, agreements over such a critical area as water rights, including the rotation of rights of irrigation, are exclusively verbal. Partnerships, pledges, leases, warranties and so forth are rarely 'paperized' but based, rather, on verbal agreement.

556 554 182 183 128 In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how the social and cultural configuration of Berber existence affects the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Among the Riffians wealth as an abstract has little meaning. Wealth gains significance when it is an attribute of prestige (although prestige does not depend entirely on wealth). Prestige is gained from living by the code of the community and fulfilling one's obligations to the community. Those who fulfill such obligations have political prestige both in the realm of the Berber community and outside it. A direct consequence of this is that profit as a system of motivation has little operative or analytic value in determining what happens to material goods. Resources are not 'free'; they cannot be allocated in a social vacuum to obtain maximum financial rewards. On the contrary, resources are socially 'bound' by

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

by burning, may completely destroy the oaks. The Mamora cork forest north of Rabat (137,000 hectares) is the largest in the world.[a] Cork oak covers about 100,000 hectares in the northern zone.[b]

Much of the economic activity in northern Morocco is concerned with the collection and shipment of cork. The bark of the trunk and the larger branches is utilized. Cork is first removed when trees are about twenty years old, with subsequent stripping every seven to ten years. The first yield (*liège mâle*) is very rough and coarse and of little value. Cork of subsequent stripping (*liège de reproduction*) is more homogeneous and of higher commercial value. In northern Morocco, cork is collected by Spanish concerns with native labor, and also by small independent operators who collect cork from isolated villages and carry it to places of deposit on the main roads. Most of the cork from northern Morocco is shipped in bulk to Spain.

Deciduous oaks cover about 7,000 hectares in northern Morocco. Two species are represented, and they have the scattered distribution characteristic of relicts. The larger stand of deciduous oaks grows at an elevation of about 1,000 meters in the mountains west of Shawen and southwest of Bab Taza—Jbil Buhashim, Jbil Sugna, and Jbil Hazana. *Quercus pyrenaica* = *Q. Tozae* is the species in this area; it appears also at elevations of 1,200–2,000 meters on Jbil Tiziran and, as the binomial indicates, in the Pyrenees. The second species, *Q. faginea* = *Q. lusitanica*, is scattered over the Sanhajan highlands. The largest stands are on the slopes between Jbil Tiziran and Jbil Leshab. Other stands appear on the slopes of Adrar Tidighin and Adrar Taghzut, and there are a few trees mixed with *Erica arborea*, *Cistus ladaniferus*, and *Pistacia lentiscus* in the maqui near Tangier.

It is difficult to explain the scattered distribution of the deciduous oaks. They are abundant in the largest forested area (fig. 8), that of the mountains west of Shawen, but many of the trees in this forest were cut by the Spanish for use as railroad ties. Both species seem to be calcifuge, and it is unlikely that either will be found in the drier parts of the zone. The scattered and mountainous distribution suggests that the deciduous oaks are Pleistocene relicts now restricted to the coolest and wettest parts of northern Morocco. The extreme polymorphism of *Quercus faginea*, with its great number of subspecies and races, seems to support this view.

The highest peaks in northern Morocco are clothed with forests of fir and cedar. The former genus is confined to the calcareous mountains east of Shawen. Two species are present: *Abies tazaotana* occurs at elevations of 1,500–1,854 meters on Jbil Tazaot, and *A. pinsapo* appears on Jbil Maggo, Jbil Tisuka, and Jbil Leshab, as well as in the mountains near Ronda in southern Spain. This restricted highland distribution again suggests that these species are relicts. On Jbil Tisuka and Jbil Leshab, forests of fir begin at an elevation of 1,600

[a] Estimate of Emberger, *Aperçu général sur la végétation du Maroc*, p. 101. For an excellent description of the Mamora forest see A. Métro and Ch. Sauvage, *Flore des végétaux ligneux de la Mamora* (Rabat: Société des Sciences Naturelles et Physiques du Maroc, 1955).

[b] This figure and the estimates of forested surface in later paragraphs are taken from S. Sánchez Cózar, "Montes," *Conferencias desarrolladas en la Academia de Interventores durante el curso de 1947* (Tetuán: Imprenta del Majzen, 1948), pp. 5–25. Earlier estimates appear in E. González Vázquez, *El Marruecos forestal* (Madrid: Ediciones Técnicas, 1945).

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

Contracts and Coöperation

675 464 171 241 When tribesmen are unable or unwilling to work their own land, contracts are made between the wealthier and the poorer members of a community; those who have little land or equipment hire themselves out to those who have more. Farmers who have more animals than they or their sons can manage, make agreements with others to care for the herd. The hired shepherds, while the animals are in their hands, receive part of the milk and butter, some of the young that are born, and, if the animals are sold, a share of the profit. The shepherd receives part, sometimes half, of the wool. Full-time employment as a shepherd is considered rather degrading, and for this reason it is the common occupation of exiles and orphans.

Vegetable gardens, orchards, and fields may be cared for by hired laborers. If their job entails the difficult task of setting up terraces, they may get up to a third of the crop. If they perform all the operations necessary for cereal cultivation, they receive a fifth of the crop. If the hired hand needs an assistant during the reaping, the latter is paid with a tenth of the harvest. Associations of this sort are not common; farm labor is ordinarily done by the landowner and his sons.

476 241 171 A second type of association takes place when two farmers own plots of about the same size but do not have enough animals or equipment to work their land independently. The two farmers join forces, each supplying his share, and the harvest is divided between them. This form of coöperation is common when a farmer has only one draft animal. In irrigated areas, one man may supply the land and part of the seed, and another the rest of the seed, the animals, and the plow. Since most communities are kinship groups, coöperation of this sort is usually among brothers or cousins.[112]

Inheritance

428 171 The inheritance of property[113] in most of Morocco follows standard Maliki practice, which allots a share to each son equal to that falling to two daughters. When a man dies his widow first receives one-eighth of his property and the remainder is divided among the sons and daughters. All sons inherit equally, as do all daughters. If a man dies leaving a widow and daughters only, the widow gets one-eighth and the remainder is divided into three parts, of which the daughters receive two and the father's brother one. If the father has no brothers, the rest (aside from the widow's share) goes to the daughters. If he does have brothers, and dies leaving only one daughter, she receives half of the property (minus the widow's share) and the brothers get the other half. If a man dies leaving no children, his widow receives a fourth of his property and the rest goes to the brothers. If a man with children dies prior to his father, the children have no right to the property and receive shares only if the grandfather agrees to such a division.

[423] Moroccans are very reluctant to divide up their land. When brothers inherit land they customarily work it jointly, the eldest brother acting as a substitute

[113] [112] On contracts and coöperation, see also A. Sánchez Pérez, "Aprovechamientos comunales y formas de cooperación en el Rif," *Selección de conferencias pronunciadas en la Academia de Interventores durante el curso 1950–51* (Tetuán: Imprenta Cremades, 1951), pp. 95–104.

[113] [113] This paragraph is based upon the remarks of D. M. Hart in *Morocco: Subcontractor's Monograph* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), pp. 141–143.

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

The answer to this dilemma, if it may be called an answer, is emigration. In the decade preceding the current disorder, more than 30,000 Rifians went to Algeria each year to work on French farms. The main drift took place during the slack winter season, but smaller groups migrated at other times of the year. Few Moroccans thought of emigration as a permanent change. They were hired by members of their own tribe appointed to serve as contractors, and messengers visited them regularly to collect money for the families left at home. Each tribe had its special place of employment. The Aith Warishik went to Sidi bel Abbes, the Aith Tuzin to Tlemcen, the Thimsaman to Blida and Ain Temouchent, and the Gal'ayan tribes to Oran.[112] The largest number of emigrants were recruited from the Aith Said, and it is not a coincidence that the territory of this tribe includes spectacular badlands. From the standpoint of the French farmer this movement was a blessing, for the Moroccans worked harder than the Algerians and were satisfied with less pay. The tribesmen of the western Rif did not join in the seasonal movement to Algeria, but many of them migrated to Tetuán and Tangier.[113]

These movements are manifestations of a general trend. The oasis dwellers of the Mzab have long practiced emigration as a solution to their problem of overpopulation. The Mozabite is a farmer in his youth and again in old age; during the middle years he may be a bus driver, a shopkeeper, or a mechanic.[114] The same tradition is found among the craftsmen of Taghzut and some of the Shluh tribesmen of the Anti Atlas. Emigration is not a new development, but in recent years it has been practiced on an unprecedented scale.[115]

[112] F. Benedicto Pérez, "Trabajadores rifeños en Argelia," *Conferencias desarrolladas en la Academia de Interventores durante el curso de 1948* (Tetuán: Imprenta del Majzen, 1949), pp. 5–17.

[113] D. M. Hart, "Notes on the Rifian Community of Tangier," *Middle East Jour.*, 11 (1957), 153–162.

[114] In the Mzab the tradition of emigration for men is combined with a tradition that women must not leave the oasis. See Karl Suter, "Die Ortsgebundenheit der Frau bei den Mozabiten," *Geographica Helvetica*, 12 (1957), 102–114.

[115] On emigration see also Günter Glauert, "Veränderungen in den Bevölkerungsstruktur Nordafrikas in den letzen Jahrzehnten," *Die Erde*, 88 (1957), 298–319; René Raynal, "Déplacements récents et actuels des populations du bassin de la Moulouya (Maroc oriental)," *Comptes Rendus du Congrès International de Géographie, Lisbonne, 1949* (Lisbon, 1952), IV, 67–80; and J. C. Petit and Castet Barou, "Contribution à l'étude des mouvements de la population marocaine musulmane et de l'exode rural," *Bull. Economique et Social du Maroc*, 68 (1953), 423–459.